Making meaning: weighing up possible states of affairs when assessing a text

Some aspects of literacy are tied up in the skills of being able to read (decode) and write (encode) the words on the page (consistently and methodically). Other aspects are extra-linguistic and are tied up in ways of speaking, seeing and doing. In this blog post, we examine the latter part of this dichotomy.

Read the following two textual samples below before proceeding with the blog post for a discussion.

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QUOTE FROM A MECHANIC’S GUIDE

To change the oil, slide under the vehicle and locate the oil drain plug. Place an oil catch pan beneath it to collect the old oil. Unscrew the drain plug using a socket wrench and allow the oil to drain completely. Once the oil has drained, locate the oil filter. Using an oil filter wrench, loosen and remove the old oil filter in a counterclockwise motion. Ensure the rubber gasket comes off with the filter. Before installing the new oil filter, lightly coat the rubber gasket with fresh oil. Then, thread the new filter onto the engine by hand, ensuring it is snug but not overtightened. Replace the oil drain plug, tightening it with a socket wrench in a clockwise motion.

QUOTE FROM A FABLE

Once upon a time, in a lush and verdant land nestled between mighty mountains, there existed a serene valley. This valley was blessed with crystal-clear streams that meandered gracefully through its heart, glistening in the golden sunlight. The waters were pure and abundant, supporting a thriving ecosystem and providing life to all who dwelled within. But as time passed, the valley faced an unprecedented threat. A dark cloud settled upon the land, bringing with it torrential rains that turned the tranquil streams into raging torrents. The once-pristine waters grew murky and polluted, carrying with them the remnants of human negligence and greed.

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Both texts express information - albeit substantially different types of information.

If I position myself as a literate person, I scrutinise the script in order to access each text. Can I decode these words? Can I follow the logic of these sentences? Can I derive pictures, sense or intention from these sentences and from the text as a whole? If I can do this, what does it all mean? How is it useful? What is important in the message? The answers to such questions rely upon a complex web of prior knowledge, of context, my immediate circumstances and my conversations with others.

We shouldn’t underestimate how difficult it may be to simply derive sense from a text, particularly the technical one. Such literal comprehension is an important starting point. With more experience, I am able to look at the text as a series of choices (Talbot, 2010; Vygotsky, 1978).

“Why this and not that? Hmmm! Let’s see what happens if I move some of these details around (or interpret them differently). What becomes of the case then?”

My position to the texts differ based on my capacity to manipulate states of affairs depicted within each text as well as other possible states of affairs that are not represented in the text. I assess what is in the text as well as what could have been in the text to better consider the choices that have been made.

This takes us back to Wittgenstein’s inspiration for the picture theory of meaning. Ludwig Wittgenstein read about a court case in which there was a vehicle accident (of some sort). The courtroom model depicted the circumstances with tangible figurines in a similar way to how words in a sentence might convey a scene. During the case, all parties would scrutinise this model to ascertain what really happened. Questions were also asked to clarify the scene, including the names of various elements. In doing so, parties would manipulate the model to get to the actual state of affairs of what occurred (from all of the possible ones).

One could draw different conclusions based on the various possible states of affairs. Those best placed to properly assess the model were those with the most first hand experience. Such witnesses would manipulate the model to suggest the true state of affairs, just as if they were carefully selecting their words in order to convey the proper picture of events. Hopefully, one came to the true and sensible picture!

Let us turn to the texts at the start of this blog post. In relation to the technical text, my comprehension relies on some familiarity with basic car mechanics so that I can interface between actual experience and the experience expressed in the text, so I can asses whether the picture is correct (or complete). I also need this context to be able to action what is described within the text. My comprehension can be assessed by how well I can apply the instructions in the world.

In such case, the act of reading is an act of simulating actions in the world. If I engage in this car mechanics on a day-to-day basis, then I have the opportunity to become competent in the field language as well as how instructional texts of this sort might mediate valued day-to-day activity. In other words, I can become competent at literacy within the context of the activities in which language and literacy are embedded, whether it is gardening or cooking or star gazing. Scaffolding the comprehension of the written and spoken also involves the carefully scaffolding of human activity.

• “To bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form.” Wittgenstein, PI 23)

• “Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of the proceedings."(Wittgenstein, OC 229)

Let us now turn our mind to the other text. Let us call it a fable. In the case of the fable, the author may or may not be aware of the many associations that a reader may attach to water, rain and cleansing, which all may come to reinforce how the text potentially expresses a view about a fragile environmental balance. If I happen to live in a place which has experienced dramatic environment and cultural change in the face of industrialism, then the fable may be more meaningful than as simply a descriptive story.

It is even more meaningful if am accustomed to stories being used to navigate shared experiences and values. To another audience, however, it all might be utter nonsense or a nice story (at face value) or something altogether different - a misleading fable that limits our potential for growth and progress.

There is a hidden assumption here. The assumption is that I occupy a form of life in which some texts have a relevance and value (and other don’t). In that form of life, a literate person is one who can decode and engage in literal comprehension, as well as engage with texts for a multitude of purposes. How I come to interpret this picture is tied up in the conversations that I have with others.

• “Children are born into a community and simply acquire the community’s language and the community’s world-picture, children do not learn single sentences or issues, but a whole language or a whole world-picture.” (Kober, 1996, pg. 422)

Where does all of this lead us? As stated at the outset, some aspects of literacy are tied up in the skills of being able to literally read (decode) and write (encode) the words on the page (consistently and methodically). Other aspects are extra-linguistic and are tied up in ways of speaking, seeing and doing. Comprehending texts is embedded within human activity, imagination and discourse, which involve particular domains of language (Gee, 1996). The latter aspects are tied up in problem solving, agency and intentionality. It is not a message that is new or novel, but still own upon which to reflect.

References

Gee, J. (1996). Social linguistics and literacies: ideology in discourses (2nd Edition). London: The Falmer Press.

Kober, M. (1996). Certainties of a world-picture: the epistemological investigations of On Certainty In H. Sluga, H. and D. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein. (pp. 411 - 441) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Talbot, J. T. (2010). Where does language come from? The role of reflexive enculturation in language development. Language Sciences 32 (1) 14-27.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in Society. (M. Cole, Ed.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Translated by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

_____________ (2001). Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Keeping the eye on the prize

Photo by BrianAJackson/iStock / Getty Images

There is a niggling concern that I always have when I become too preoccupied with "the basics" of literacy, including components like phonemic awareness and phonics. Sure, these skills are essential, and it’s relatively simple to measure progress in such areas, but I can't help but think, "this isn't the hardest part about literacy, though. We still need to integrate this knowledge into more complex and more ambiguous acts of communication."

I have witnessed many learners who develop such basics, but who still go on to struggle with reading and writing. At the risk of sounding unfair, they often struggle with the patience, stamina, concentration, guidance or even time to become a strong(er) reader/writer - all of which comes through opportunities to manipulate the script.

It reminds me of this little picture that Wittgenstein once painted of someone who had learned to deliberate over a task, “every now and then there is the problem 'Should I use this bit?' — The bit is rejected, another is tried. Bits are tentatively put together, then dismantled; he looks for one that fits etc.. So I sometimes make him say 'No, that bit is too long, perhaps another one fits better.' — Or 'What am I to do now?' — 'Got it!' — Or 'That’s not bad”' etc. ..." In particular, the act of writing resembles this inner dialogue. It's not a straightforward linear task.

At the culmination of this passage, Wittgenstein rightly states, "thinking gives [the learner] the possibility of perfecting his methods." Learning to read and write effectively is a bit like this inner dialogue. Actual reading and writing involves quite intricate acts of problem solving. The learner needs plenty of practice chewing over texts and creating them, particularly after they have gained momentum with the basics.

Wittgenstein presents us with an similar image of teaching that seems to suggest how one initiates another into ways of working, “if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him … by means of examples and by practice. -- And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself. In the course of this teaching I shall show him … get him to continue an ornamental pattern uniformly when told to do so. -- And also to continue progressions. And so, for example: I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained by means of themselves; [they makes sense in the context of the practice ... of apprenticeship].” (Philosophical Investigations, #280)

Consequently, this places experience at the forefront of learning. In other words, the learner requires the practical experience to integrate component skills into meaningful, literate act(ivitie)s. In doing so, the learner becomes adept at manipulating the script, and the mentor teacher provides the learner with opportunities to exert this knowledge in engaging ways. Therefore, “the teacher’s role is to help the child by arranging tasks and activities in such a way that [advanced tasks] are more easily accessible.” (Verhoeven and Snow, 2001, pg 4-5)

This gradual initiation relates to something I mention in the recent grammar/sentence presentation. That is, the rules of grammar do not tell me why one sentence should precede or follow another, nor do they tell me anything about what should be the content of my ideas. They may help me formulate and re-formulate a sentence with greater ease - and this is of value - but this in itself does not dictate the logic or content of my communication. Often the sequence of my sentences is guided by convention, and convention is shaped by the expectations of my audience. And I must have had enough experience with this audience to have a sensible understanding of my idea and how to express this idea.

As Ray Monk (1999) would say, “the reason computers have no understanding of the sentences they process is not that they lack sufficient neuronal complexity, but that they are not, and cannot be, participants in the culture to which the sentences belong. A sentence does not acquire meaning through the correlation, one to one, of its words with objects in the world; it acquires meaning through the use that is made of it in the communal life of human beings."

A similar sentiment led Newton Garver (1996) to express the following comment.

“If Wittgenstein and Saussure agree in using ‘grammar’ descriptively, they disagree about ... other matters. One is that Wittgenstein’s grammar has to do with uses of language (discourse conditions and discourse continuation) rather than forms and their combinations (morphology and syntax) ...

"Considering uses rather than forms is a deep rather than a superficial departure from classical linguistic methodology ... Studying uses of language makes context prominent, whereas the study of forms lends itself naturally to analysis.” (Garver, 1996, pg 151)

Maybe I am stating the obvious. Perhaps, I am not making a strong point here. But I write this against the backdrop of the proposal to introduce the Year 1 Phonics Check here in Australia. Whilst I have no objection of teachers getting good data on what their students can and cannot decode, we should always keep our eyes on the prize, which involves the integration of this knowledge into meaningful acts of reading and writing. I often ask, “how can I create opportunities for learners to integrate their skills into meaning making? How do I support and motivate them to take risks and challenge themselves?” We should always offer students opportunities to “use their expanding knowledge of language and their growing powers of influence to figure out [how to read and write] texts.” (Wolf, pp 131)

There you go. I’ve had my say. It’s not a critique of anything. Just an observation.

References

Garver, N. (1996). Philosophy as grammar. In H. Sluga & D. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 139–170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Monk, R. (1999, July 29). Wittgenstein’s Forgotten Lesson. Propsect Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ray-monk-wittgenstein/#.Uo_n_pHqvGY

Verhoeven, L. and Snow, C. (2001). Literacy and motivation: bridging cognitive and sociocultural viewpoints. In Verhoeven, L. and Snow, C. (Eds.), Literacy and motivation: reading engagement in individuals and groups (pp. 1- 22). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers

Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Wolf, M. (2008). Proust and the squid: the story and science of the reading brain. Cambridge: Icon Books.

The pupil must want to go on alone in taking language to the world

I can't seem to shake a preoccupation that continues to surface whenever I try and come to some synthesis of literacy. I am dogged by a persistent dichotomy. On the one hand, literacy is a skill to be mastered, which involves the methodological development of the formal characteristics of language and of the written code. On the other hand, literacy is a creative, communicative practice that calls upon the imagination, the intellect and social cognition, which is much less mechanical and much more about craft, application and growing expertise.

So ... whilst a learner may master the mechanical features of literacy through practice, revision and integration, the applied aspects of literacy require one to negotiate concepts of context, convention, intention, prior knowledge and (possible) meanings, which are not so formally defined.

This integration of form with intention reflects remarks from British philosopher Ray Monk (1999):

"The reason computers have no understanding of the sentences they process is not that they lack sufficient neuronal complexity, but that they are not, and cannot be, participants in the culture to which the sentences belong. A sentence does not acquire meaning through the correlation, one to one, of its words with objects in the world; it acquires meaning through the use that is made of it in the communal life of human beings."

The following "diagram" tries to broach the dichotomy once again. On the left hand side, there are the formal elements of language and literacy. On the right hand side, there are the functional areas to which language and literacy are put to use. And down the centre are quotes which move from a focus on mastery to a focus on application.

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Consequently, language and literacy are much more than the mastery of a technique, even though mastery is a significant component of early literacy. The philosopher Rush Rhees (2006) grapples with this temptation to see language as a set of self-contained skills:

"The people who argued with Socrates and Plato may have thought language was just a collection of techniques, and that that was what understanding is: knowing the technique ... For them, the growth of understanding could only mean the growth of skill (efficiency, I suppose) or the multiplication of skills ... A skill would have the sort of unity that a calculus does ... Is understanding just competence?" (pg. 3)

By ending with a rhetorical question, Rhees is expressing some doubt in the idea that understanding is simply a measure of technical proficiency alone. Learning how to spell can be considered to be a technical skill. Knowing how to parse a sentence is also a technical exercise. Yet understanding and communicating are much more complex than technical prowess,

"If you understand anything in language, you must understand what the dialogue is, and you must see how understanding grows as the dialogue grows ... For language is discourse, is speaking. It is telling people things and trying to follow them. And that is what you try to understand ... You understand when it adds to your understanding of the discussion. Or of what the discussion is about." (Rhees, 2006, pg. 7) 

At the same time that one is mastering elements of language and literacy, one must be granted opportunities to put these elements into practice, such as through interactive writing, scaffolded discussion, dialogic reading, poetry clubs, anchored instruction, literature circles, the language experience approach and more. In doing so, life is breathed into what would otherwise be cold and lifeless. Whilst it may be convenient to see literacy as a set of skills that are built progressively and mechanically, we must remind ourselves (as Stanley Cavell reminds us),

“The pupil must want to go on alone in taking language [and literacy] to the world, and that what is said must be worth [saying and writing], have a point (warning, informing, amusing, promising, questioning, chastising, counting, insisting, beseeching, specifying the location of pain, and so on) .. If it is part of teaching to undertake to validate these measures of interest, then it would be quite as if teaching must, as it were, undertake to show a reason for [communicating] at all.” (Cavell, 2005, pg 115)

Garver (1996) suggests that the shifting of attention between matters of form and matters of function is no simple act. They represent quite different paradigms.

“If Wittgenstein and Saussure agree in using ‘grammar’ descriptively, they disagree about ... other matters. One is that Wittgenstein’s grammar has to do with uses of language (discourse conditions and discourse continuation) rather than forms and their combinations (morphology and syntax) ...

"Considering uses rather than forms is a deep rather than a superficial departure from classical linguistic methodology ... Studying uses of language makes context prominent, whereas the study of forms lends itself naturally to analysis.” (Garver, 1996, pg 151)

Formal theories of meaning seek to explain how a language expresses a sense through an understanding of the language's logical structure. One must have access to the phonetic, syntactic and lexical knowledge to be able to decode sentences and to decipher the pictures expressed by them. This process is an analytical exchange. In a purely formal account of meaning, the individual would only be required to calculate the exact, unambiguous meaning of a proposition from available signs as long as the proposition was logically expressed and all terms were accounted for clearly and directly. 

Meaning-in-context, on the other hand, is less static and more elusive. The meaning of an utterance requires an understanding of its context, a familiarity with the way the utterance is being exchanged, the intention of the utterance, and the position of the utterance within a 'language game' or 'conversation'. Such a theory of meaning must take into account that the subject is a creative, imaginative agent who extends (or projects) new language practices from prior encounters, and that such meaning is framed by the individual's social and discourse practices. Becoming literate also requires that one incorporates the role of “textuality” into one’s life, such as writing lists, emails, letters, notes, poems, etc. And it is bolstered when one experiences positive encounters of meaning making (and learning) with others (e.g. sharing a favourite book with someone you respect).

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If I am able to allude to a final theorist here, this dynamic exchange of meaning-making is what Bakhtin (1981) refers to as the dialogic imagination. And it is the dialogic imagination that propels the text (or the logic of a text) forward.  In other words, it is an explicit or implicit awareness of the underlying dialogue and associations - made up of questions, expectations, motifs, and conventions - that provide the rationale for the shape and significance of a text. Even as a text struggles to be unique, it exists within the frame of prior conversations and experiences. The more familiar one is with certain activities and conversations - or the text's semiotic domain/context - the deeper one will engage with and comprehend the text (Gee, 2003). If this is done in language that is accessible to the learner, then the possibilities for deep learning are extended even further. In this case, the lower order skills of word/sentence recognition are processed more deeply within the higher order skills of verbal reasoning, prior knowledge and extra-rationale interpretation.

What - then - is the point of this long-winded musing? In one sense, it is the continuation of a long-running discussion of the importance of balancing code-based and meaning-based practice. Those who are familiar with this site will see how this discussion features regularly. On another hand, I would like to return to the statement quoted in the title  "the pupil must want to go on alone in taking language to the world." In other words, effective teaching builds skills AND provides rich, motivating opportunities to use these skills in committed acts of communication. This adds something even more elusive to the mix: as teachers, we must inspire learners to read, write, speak, listen, learn and express.

References

Bakhtin, M. (1981). The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Cavell, S. (2005). Philosophy the day after tomorrow. In Philosophy the day after tomorrow (pp. 111 – 131). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Garver, N. (1996). Philosophy as grammar. In H. Sluga & D. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 139 – 170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gee, J. P. (2003). Opportunity to learn: a language-based perspective on assessment. In Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy and Practice, Vol 10, No. 1, pp 27 - 46

Monk, R. (1999, July 29). Wittgenstein’s Forgotten Lesson. Prospect Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ray-monk-wittgenstein/#.Uo_n_pHqvGY

Rhees, R. (2006). Wittgenstein and the possibility of discourse (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.